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RETHEORIZING PRECEDENT 
RANDY J. KOZEL† 
ABSTRACT 
Does the doctrine of stare decisis support judicial attempts to retheorize 
dubious precedents by putting them on firmer footing? If it does, can 
retheorization provide a means for Chevron to endure as a staple of 
administrative law notwithstanding serious challenges to its established 
rationale? 
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INTRODUCTION 
The future of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.1 is bound up with a legal phenomenon that is both 
ubiquitous and enigmatic. That phenomenon is retheorization, or the 
recasting of a prior judicial decision based on a new rationale. 
Lawyers and academics retheorize cases all the time. Judges do 
too. Yet the practice remains disputed. The role of retheorization is 
part of a broader contest between stability and evolution in the path of 
the law. At issue is how far today’s judges can, and should, go in 
attempting to preserve a decision they view as flawed. May a judge 
defer to a precedent on stare decisis grounds even while altering its 
foundation? Or is retheorization tantamount to reinvention, such that 
today’s court must dispense with the presumption of deference to 
which precedents generally are entitled?  
To isolate the problem of retheorization, this Article focuses on a 
court in the process of determining whether to uphold or renounce a 
dubious precedent. As that process is unfolding, the question is not 
simply how the court’s decision will be received by future generations. 
Of more immediate interest is whether the judges who currently 
occupy the bench ought to defer to a precedent even if they believe it 
can only be sustained on a novel rationale. Stare decisis is a doctrine of 
close cases, and if the new rationale is plausible but debatable, 
retheorization could end up tipping the scales. 
In modern American jurisprudence, among the most intriguing, 
and potentially impactful, applications of retheorization relates to the 
Chevron doctrine. Efforts to retheorize Chevron are legion in the 
academic literature, and they illustrate how and why judicial decisions 
are reimagined over time.2 Chevron’s viability is also a topic of debate, 
and controversy, within the judiciary.3 If there is a way to retheorize 
Chevron that widens its appeal—making the decision more palatable 
to those who do not accept its prevailing rationale, which is grounded 
in assumptions about congressional intent—the future of 
administrative law might well be altered. But that is only true if 
retheorization is a valid adjudicative technique. 
This Article discusses retheorization both as a general concept and 
with particular attention to the Chevron doctrine. After defining the 
 
 1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 2. See infra Part III.C. 
 3. See infra Part III.B. 
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stakes of the debate over retheorization, the Article examines the 
ramifications for Chevron. It contends that principles of stare decisis 
support judicial efforts to retheorize Chevron in order to preserve the 
case’s rule of decision. Perhaps a given Supreme Court Justice cannot 
bring herself to accept Chevron’s intent-based rationale. Nevertheless, 
if she views some alternative defense of Chevron as plausible, she is 
well advised to embrace that theory and uphold Chevron’s rule in 
pursuit of a stable, impersonal legal regime. 
It is worth noting two questions this Article will not discuss. The 
first is whether Chevron is correct on the merits.4 The second is whether 
there is sufficient justification for overruling Chevron.5 These are vital 
questions, but the project here is exploring the distinct issue of 
retheorization and what it means for the future of administrative law.  
Finally, while the validity of retheorization is relevant across the 
federal and state judiciaries, this Article focuses on the impact of 
retheorization at the U.S. Supreme Court, given that tribunal’s 
authorship of, and revisory authority over, the Chevron decision.  
I.  WHY RETHEORIZATION MATTERS 
Chevron is often described as having two steps, one relating to 
whether a statute is clear6 and the second relating to whether the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable.7 The doctrine of stare decisis 
prescribes a two-step analysis of its own. First comes the question 
whether a decision is mistaken. Next comes the question whether the 
decision should be retained despite its flaws.8 Resolving the first 
 
 4. For discussion of challenges to Chevron, see infra Part III.B. 
 5. On the possibility of narrowing Chevron rather than overruling it or reaffirming it in 
whole, see Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 
931, 964 (2021) (arguing that “the Court should revisit the notion of deferring to statutory 
interpretations announced by agencies in adjudications”). On the narrowing of precedent as a 
more general phenomenon, see generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme 
Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861 (2014). 
 6. On the complexity of this threshold step, see, for example, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing 
Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2136 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMAN, 
JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). 
 7. On the application of Chevron’s second step and its implications for agency discretion, 
see generally Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1441 (2018). 
 8. Some judicial opinions describe a different sequence: the Court looks first to norms of 
stare decisis and finds them sufficiently compelling to obviate the need for resolving whether the 
precedent under review is correct or incorrect. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 
443 (2000) (“Whether or not we would agree with Miranda’s reasoning and its resulting rule, were 
KOZEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2021  5:09 PM 
1028  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1025 
question only “poses” the second,9 which brings into play 
considerations of stability, reliance, humility, and the impersonality 
that results when Justices view themselves not simply as individuals, 
but as part of a continuous institution that endures over time.10  
Within a system of stare decisis, a decision’s flaws and its claim to 
survival present independent questions calling for independent 
analyses. Sometimes Justices apply the doctrine of stare decisis and 
conclude that the decision under review must be overruled. Other 
times, they defer to a decision on stare decisis grounds notwithstanding 
its shortcomings. 
Alongside the questions whether a precedent is correct on the 
merits and whether it ought to survive despite its flaws, I wish to raise 
a third question to inform the stare decisis analysis: whether today’s 
Court should entertain the possibility of retheorizing a precedent as a 
method of preserving it. To that end, this Part explains how the 
retheorization of precedent can affect the path of the law. The Part 
begins by discussing retheorization as a general matter before turning 
specifically to the Chevron doctrine. 
A. Retheorization as Adjudicative Technique 
A commitment to stare decisis “means sticking to some wrong 
decisions.”11 By design, the doctrine guarantees that some incorrect 
decisions will remain on the books.12 At the U.S. Supreme Court, stare 
decisis requires a “special justification” for overruling precedent, 
above and beyond the sitting Justices’ disagreement with that 
 
we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against 
overruling it now.”). 
 9. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 144 (2005) 
[hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] (statement of Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“It is not enough 
that you may think the prior decision was wrongly decided. That really doesn’t answer the 
question. It just poses the question.”). 
 10. Cf. Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1711, 1711 (2013) (“Sometimes [stare decisis] functions less to handle doctrinal missteps than to 
mediate intense disagreements between justices about the fundamental nature of the 
Constitution.”). 
 11. Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015). 
 12. See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in 
part) (“[T]o overrule a constitutional precedent, the Court requires something ‘over and above 
the belief that the precedent was wrongly decided.’” (quoting Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 
1003 (2020))); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2423 (2019) (“Of course, it is good—and 
important—for our opinions to be right and well-reasoned. But that is not the test for overturning 
precedent.”). 
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precedent’s reasoning.13 The special justification might be that the 
precedent rests on a factual mistake or an assumption that has eroded 
over time.14 Or the precedent might have yielded a rule that does not 
function effectively as a procedural matter.15  
Importantly, if more controversially, Justices have indicated that 
a precedent is subject to overruling if it is not just incorrect, but 
obviously and severely so.16 This exceptional wrongness might arise 
from reasoning that today’s Justices view as “demonstrably 
erroneous.”17 Or it might be the product of a precedent’s disastrous 
consequences.18 Either way, the precedent moves beyond the realm of 
plausibility into the category of manifest or inordinately prejudicial 
error. The precedent accordingly is subject to overruling. 
Rather than reaffirming or overruling a decision, Justices 
occasionally recognize a third option: retheorizing the decision to give 
it a stronger legal and conceptual foundation.19 A Justice might 
contemplate retheorization because, while she believes that a 
decision’s rationale is problematic, she sees good reasons for retaining 
the decision on a different, more persuasive rationale. Alternatively, 
the Justice might conclude that the decision’s rationale is sound, but 
she might surmise that another rationale would carry more weight with 
her colleagues. 
 
 13. See, e.g., Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422 (“[A]ny departure from the doctrine demands ‘special 
justification’—something more than ‘an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided.’” 
(quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014))). See generally 
Randy J. Kozel, Special Justifications, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125 (2019) (examining various ways of 
understanding the concept of a special justification for overruling precedent).  
 14. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2095 (2018) (noting the dramatic 
changes in the world of online retailing since the relevant precedent issued). 
 15. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2008) (noting the relevance of whether 
a decisional rule has worked properly). 
 16. See, e.g., Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (including among 
the stare decisis factors “the quality of the precedent’s reasoning,” and noting that “[a] garden-
variety error or disagreement does not suffice to overrule”); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
827 (1991) (including among the stare decisis factors whether a prior decision was “badly 
reasoned”). For an argument that the inquiry into demonstrable or clear error is problematic, see 
RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 118–21 (2017). 
 17. See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1986 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 18. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1415 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (recognizing that the 
stare decisis analysis includes the question whether “the prior decision caused significant negative 
jurisprudential or real-world consequences”); cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 377 (2010) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that if stare decisis were absolute, “segregation would be legal, 
minimum wage laws would be unconstitutional, and the Government could wiretap ordinary 
criminal suspects without first obtaining warrants”). 
 19. See infra notes 33–39 and accompanying text. 
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In either scenario, the jurisprudential question is how to think 
about the role of stare decisis during the process of retheorization. 
Should today’s Justices defer to a prior decision even while revising its 
rationale? Or does the act of updating the original rationale essentially 
extinguish the precedent, leaving stare decisis with no role to play and 
requiring the Justices to proceed as if they were resolving a case of first 
impression?  
Retheorization is most salient when the special justification for 
overruling is the belief that a precedent’s rationale is too flawed to 
accept. When the problem is the glaring inadequacy (as perceived by 
today’s Justices) of a decision’s rationale, it is worth considering 
whether the decision’s rule might still be salvaged on an alternative 
basis. 
An example should clarify the inquiry. In 2018, the Supreme Court 
addressed the First Amendment implications of compulsory agency 
fees paid to public sector labor unions.20 Four decades earlier, the 
Court had ruled in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education21 that laws 
requiring public employees to subsidize certain union activities, such 
as collective bargaining, do not violate the First Amendment.22 Those 
laws, the Court explained, were supported by the government’s interest 
in promoting “labor peace”23 and ensuring that employees who benefit 
from a union’s activities pay their fair share.24 So long as compulsory 
fees were used to support activities like collective bargaining, as 
opposed to “ideological activities” like “the expression of political 
views,” those fees did not violate the First Amendment.25  
Abood sparked considerable debate over the years, and the 
Supreme Court called the decision’s reasoning into doubt on several 
occasions.26 By 2018, it appeared increasingly likely that the Court 
would take the final step of overruling Abood and invalidating laws 
requiring the payment of agency fees to public sector unions. 
Imagine that you are a Justice in 2018 contemplating what to do 
with Abood. You conclude that the decision’s stated rationale is 
 
 20. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 
(2018). 
 21. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 22. Id. at 232. 
 23. Id. at 224; see also Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465 (discussing the concept of labor peace). 
 24. Abood, 431 U.S. at 224. 
 25. Id. at 235–36. 
 26. See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 635 (2014) (“The Abood Court’s analysis is 
questionable on several grounds.”). 
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“manifestly erroneous”27 and utterly untenable. You find the 
arguments about promoting labor peace entirely unconvincing, and 
you believe the government’s interest in avoiding free riders is plainly 
inadequate to warrant restricting expressive liberty by compelling 
financial support of public sector unions. At the same time, you think 
it is a much closer call whether the Abood approach is supported by a 
different argument—namely, that compulsory fee laws represent a 
reasonable regulation of speech within public workplaces.28 You see 
some merit in the contention that the government has discretion to 
regulate interactions among its employees, even in ways that diminish 
expressive liberty, when it acts in a managerial capacity by pursuing 
operational objectives unrelated to the suppression of speech.29 Then 
again, you also see merit in the counterargument that the government’s 
prerogative to manage its workplace does not authorize mandatory 
fees paid to labor unions.30  
You are leaning toward accepting the latter argument and 
concluding that the government’s added discretion to manage public 
workplaces does not encompass compulsory agency fees. But you view 
the question as close and subject to reasonable disagreement. 
Moreover, you note that Abood has been a feature of American 
constitutional law for nearly half a century, shaping the expectations of 
lawmakers, employees, and unions.31 
The time arrives for you to cast your vote. If the case were one of 
first impression—if, in other words, Abood were not on the books—
you would vote to invalidate compulsory fee laws, despite your 
recognition that there is a plausible argument for upholding them as an 
extension of the government’s authority to oversee public workplaces. 
But you are not writing on a clean slate. Abood is the law of the land 
and has been for some time. Even though you cannot accept Abood’s 
stated rationale, you would be comfortable voting to retain Abood as 
an application of the Court’s public employee speech doctrine. 
 
 27. See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in 
part) (deeming it relevant whether a prior decision is “not just wrong, but grievously or 
egregiously wrong”). 
 28. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983) (recognizing the unique rules 
that determine the constitutionality of restrictions on the speech of public employees).  
 29. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2492 
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 30. See id. at 2472 (majority opinion). 
 31. Cf. id. at 2499 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority’s decision to overrule 
Abood “wreaks havoc on entrenched legislative and contractual arrangements”). 
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Although you think the employee speech argument in support of 
Abood’s rule is, on balance, incorrect, you view it as plausible.  
The plausibility of this alternative rationale, combined with 
Abood’s status as a longstanding precedent that has engendered 
significant reliance,32 leads you to consider voting to retheorize and 
reaffirm Abood as a case involving the regulation of government 
workplaces. You accordingly must determine whether retheorization 
is a legitimate judicial technique, or whether the only two options are 
overruling Abood or reaffirming it on its original rationale.  
Abood is just one illustration of the implications of retheorization. 
Other examples abound, and they arise in a variety of contexts and 
postures. A court might retheorize a line of cases involving the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause to ground them in the 
Constitution’s original meaning.33 Or a case involving the lawfulness of 
abortion regulations as driven not by the trimester of pregnancy, but 
rather by whether the right to abortion has been unduly burdened.34 Or 
a case construing Article I’s Commerce Clause to depend on whether 
the law at issue was a standalone provision as opposed to part of a 
comprehensive statutory scheme.35 Or a case involving deference to 
administrative agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations as 
flowing from notions of institutional competence rather than 
determinations about the best way to discern intended meanings.36 
Or the Court might receive a request to retheorize decisions 
asserting various constitutional liberties against the states as drawing 
on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, not 
its Due Process Clause.37 Or a request to retheorize decisions 
 
 32. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019) (noting the importance of reliance 
interests to the stare decisis analysis); cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) 
(observing that the relevant precedent, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), had “become 
embedded in routine police practice to the point where [its prescribed warnings] have become 
part of our national culture”). 
 33. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (“Although the results of our 
decisions have generally been faithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the 
same cannot be said of our rationales.”). 
 34. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875–77 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
 35. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005). 
 36. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Revisiting Seminole Rock, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 88–
91 (2018) (noting this type of argument with respect to Bowles v. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. 410 
(1945), and Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)).  
 37. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758 (2010) (“In petitioners’ view, the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects all of the rights set out in the Bill of Rights, as well as 
some others . . . .”). 
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permitting the restriction of corporate political advocacy based on 
concerns about corruption, instead of worries about misuse of the 
corporate form.38 Or to retheorize the rules for certain takings claims 
based on specific features of litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.39  
In each of these examples, retheorization is part of the 
conversation about precedent. As the Abood episode demonstrates, 
the impact of retheorization is greatest when three features are present. 
First, a Justice views the precedent’s rationale as deeply and 
irredeemably flawed. Second, the Justice believes there are one or 
more alternative rationales for the precedent—that is, rationales the 
deciding Court did not rely upon—that are plausible, even if ultimately 
incorrect. And third, the Justice thinks the doctrine of stare decisis 
counsels retention of the decision if it can be placed on firmer footing. 
Putting these considerations together yields the following framework: 
TABLE 1: OVERRULING VERSUS RETHEORIZING 
Source of Rationale 
Perception of Rationale 
by Sitting Justice Judicial Response 
Actual Rationale 
Supporting the 






That Could Support the 
Decision Under Review 




When a Justice views a precedent’s articulated rationale(s) as so 
clearly flawed as to foreclose reaffirmance, but when she nevertheless 
believes there is a plausible, alternative rationale that could support 
the decision’s retention, the validity of retheorization moves to the 
forefront. The Justice must determine whether stare decisis supports a 
judicial effort to preserve the decision under review even if that means 
replacing its rationale—or, rather, whether deference is inappropriate 
when the Court is engaged in revising a decision’s rationale instead of 
reaffirming the decision wholesale.  
 
 38. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010) (noting the argument that 
“corporate political speech can be banned in order to prevent corruption or its appearance”). 
 39. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019) (noting that “[r]espondents 
have taken a new tack” in defending the precedents under review). 
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B. Retheorization and the Future of Chevron 
The mechanics and validity of retheorization carry important 
ramifications for the future of the Chevron doctrine. We will explore 
Chevron’s rule and rationale in short order, but for now, a brief 
summary will set the stage.  
In Chevron, the Supreme Court set forth principles to define the 
respective roles of the judiciary and the executive in the process of 
statutory interpretation. When litigation involves an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering, a reviewing 
court must begin, unremarkably, by asking “whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”40 If the answer is yes, 
that is the end of the matter, irrespective of what the agency might 
believe about the statute’s meaning.41 But when Congress’s intent is 
unclear, the agency’s interpretation is often entitled to deference so 
long as it is reasonable.42 Judges must defer to the agency’s reasonable 
construction even if they think the agency probably got it wrong.43 
Chevron thus furnished “a legal framework used by courts to resolve 
questions of statutory ambiguity.”44  
Chevron has become a source of considerable controversy. 
Among those who have challenged the decision are Justices Clarence 
Thomas45 and Neil Gorsuch.46 Likewise, just before he retired, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy filed a concurrence calling for reconsideration of 
“the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented 
that decision.”47 Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent in the same case 
 
 40. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 41. Id. at 842–43.  
 42. Id. at 843. Not all statutes give rise to Chevron deference. See United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001) (identifying circumstances that can suggest the appropriateness 
of Chevron deference, prominently including “express congressional authorizations to engage in 
the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference 
is claimed”); Hickman & Nielson, supra note 5, at 936 (“[I]t is especially important now for the 
bench and bar to recall that not every agency interpretation is eligible for Chevron deference.”).  
 43. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11. 
 44. Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory 
Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 612 (2014). 
 45. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Chevron 
deference raises serious separation-of-powers questions.”). 
 46. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2446 n.114 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (referring to “serious questions . . . about whether [Chevron] comports with the APA 
and the Constitution”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (contending that “Chevron . . . permit[s] executive bureaucracies to 
swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power”).  
 47. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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referred to Chevron as “increasingly maligned,” albeit still “good 
law.”48  
Against this backdrop, two questions emerge from the standpoint 
of stare decisis. The first is whether Chevron is not just incorrect, but 
so exceptionally problematic as to warrant overruling pursuant to the 
doctrine of stare decisis—which demands a special justification for any 
departures from precedent.49 The second is whether the Justices should 
investigate alternative rationales for Chevron that might support the 
decision’s retention. If retheorization is a legitimate component of the 
stare decisis analysis, the Justices could properly maintain a 
presumption of deference to precedent even as they put a faulty 
decision on firmer footing. 
We thus return to the role of retheorization. In assessing the 
validity of that practice, the starting point is analyzing how a decision’s 
rule and rationale work together to determine precedential effect. 
II.  THE PROCESS OF RETHEORIZATION 
The previous Part introduced the concept of retheorization as a 
general matter and as applied to the Chevron doctrine. I explained how 
the implications of retheorization can affect a dubious precedent’s 
durability.  
If the act of retheorization extinguishes the deference owed to a 
precedent, a Justice considering whether to retain the precedent on a 
new rationale should proceed as if she were addressing a case of first 
impression. Only if the new rationale leads to the best approach on the 
merits may the precedent survive. Any presumption of continuity 
disintegrates the moment a Justice concludes that the precedent’s 
articulated rationale is too flawed to accept on its own terms.  
If, by contrast, retheorization is allowed to proceed against the 
backdrop of deference that defines the doctrine of stare decisis, it is 
appropriate for Justices to consider retaining a flawed precedent on a 
new rationale—and, in doing so, to operate with a presumption against 
overruling.  
By breaking judicial decisions into their constituent parts, we can 
better understand how the doctrine of stare decisis attaches to 
 
 48. Id. at 2121, 2129 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 49. See, e.g., Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422 (“[A]ny departure from the doctrine demands ‘special 
justification’—something more than ‘an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided.’” 
(quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014))). 
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individual elements as well as the integrated whole. That process yields 
lessons about the validity of retheorization by adding specificity to the 
idea of what constitutes a binding judicial decision. Decisional rules 
and decisional rationales work together to shape a precedent’s impact. 
The two concepts are deeply related, but they are analytically distinct. 
A. Rules and Rationales 
To retheorize a precedent is to preserve its rule of decision while 
furnishing a novel justification. Analyzing the impact of retheorization 
requires separating the precedential effect of decisional rules from the 
precedential effect of underlying rationales.  
Distinguishing rules from rationales is part of a broader inquiry 
into a precedent’s scope of constraint.50 Some issues of precedential 
scope are fairly straightforward. A decision’s mandate, meaning the 
court’s “formal direction” about how to resolve the dispute before it, 
is binding.51 So is the application of a particular legal provision to a 
contested set of facts. When, for example, the Supreme Court 
concludes that a red grouper does not qualify as a “tangible object” 
whose disposal (in an effort to avoid detection of unlawful fishing) is 
prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1519,52 the same will be true in the next case 
involving a red grouper. The Court’s interpretation of the statutory 
phrase “tangible object” will command deference and trigger the 
requirement of a special justification for any overruling in the years 
ahead.53 
The same goes for future cases involving the disposal of other 
types of fish. The conclusion that § 1519’s definition of “tangible 
object”54 excludes red grouper suggests that the statute must also be 
 
 50. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Precedential Constraint, Its Scope and Strength: A Brief Survey 
of the Possibilities and Their Merits, in 3 ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRECEDENT 1 (Thomas 
Bustamante & Carlos Bernal Pulido eds., 2012) (distinguishing precedential scope from 
precedential strength, with the former defined as “how broadly precedents constrain” and the 
latter defined as “how strongly they do so”); cf. Adam N. Steinman, Case Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
1947, 1950 (2017) (contrasting the question “when a case could or should be overruled” with the 
question whether it “has generated binding law that would even need to be overruled”).  
 51. Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1, 17 & n.70 (2013).  
 52. See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 531–32 (2015). 
 53. The interpretation will also bind the lower courts, even if they believe that the Supreme 
Court was incorrect. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 
484 (1989) (instructing lower courts to leave to the Supreme Court “the prerogative of overruling 
its own decisions”). 
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2018).  
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interpreted to exclude smallmouth bass. Accepting this jump from red 
grouper to smallmouth bass illustrates a simple but foundational point: 
judicial precedents are binding not only in their application of law to 
fact, but also in the rules of decision they generate.55 
Matters become more complicated when we search for principles 
to define the degree of generality at which rules should be 
characterized. If red grouper and smallmouth bass are not tangible 
objects under § 1519, what about toads? Snails? Digital photographs? 
Answering these questions requires identifying the applicable 
decisional rule. The Supreme Court observed, after considering § 1519 
in context as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that Congress is unlikely 
to “have buried a general spoliation statute covering objects of any and 
every kind in a provision targeting fraud in financial recordkeeping.”56 
That explains the Court’s interpretation of the statute to “cover only 
objects one can use to record or preserve information.”57 The Court’s 
decision thus contains a “rule, as implied by the rationale necessary for 
the result,” that is entitled to deference via the doctrine of stare 
decisis.58 
The interaction between the decisional rule and the reasons that 
support it comes into focus as we move to the time-honored concept of 
ratio decidendi. Generally speaking, the holding of a decision is “the 
court’s determination of the concrete problem before it.”59 The ratio 
decidendi, by comparison, is “a genus-proposition of which the 
concrete holding is one species or instance.”60 As Justice Gorsuch 
 
 55. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, On Treating Unlike Cases Alike, in 33 CONST. COMMENT. 
437, 438 (2018) (describing the role of precedent in counseling like treatment of cases that are 
dissimilar in some respects); Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered 
Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012) (arguing that a subsequent judge has a duty to treat a 
rule of precedent as “a general norm” to which his court “has already committed itself”). 
 56. Yates, 574 U.S. at 546. 
 57. Id. at 536. 
 58. Solum, supra note 51, at 20. 
 59. BRYAN A. GARNER, CARLOS BEA, REBECCA WHITE BERCH, NEIL M. GORSUCH, 
HARRIS L. HARTZ, NATHAN L. HECHT, BRETT M. KAVANAUGH, ALEX KOZINSKI, SANDRA L. 
LYNCH, WILLIAM H. PRYOR JR., THOMAS M. REAVLEY, JEFFREY S. SUTTON, DIANE P. WOOD 
& STEPHEN BREYER, THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 46 (2016); see also id. at 44 (noting 
that the holding “focus[es] on the legal questions actually presented to and decided by the court” 
and “constitutes the precedent”). 
 60. Id.; see also Solum, supra note 51, at 22 (describing the ratio decidendi as “the rule that 
is logically implied by the stated reasons necessary to the resolution of the case on the facts before 
the appellate court and the legal arguments presented by the parties”); cf. Ramos v. Louisiana, 
140 S. Ct. 1390, 1429 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing “the narrowest understanding of a 
precedent as this Court has understood the concept” to mean “[t]he decision prescribes a 
particular outcome when all the conditions in a clearly defined set are met”).  
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recently noted, the ratio decidendi relates to a “judicial decision’s 
reasoning,” which “allows it to have life and effect in the disposition of 
future cases.”61 The term encompasses both decisional rules and 
decisional rationales,62 and it continues to play a significant role in 
shaping the law of precedent.63 
In some cases, a decisional rule is easy to separate from its 
underlying rationale. Indeed, one can state countless doctrinal rules in 
terms that seem independent of underlying justifications. Speech 
restrictions that discriminate on the basis of content are invalid unless 
the government satisfies strict scrutiny.64 A contract is voidable by 
reason of mutual mistake if the parties made an incorrect assumption 
that materially affects the deal.65 Statements like these capture 
doctrinal rules without delving into the reasons that support them.  
To be sure, the underlying rationale is relevant as a tool for 
guiding a decisional rule’s application, particularly in difficult cases.66 
Nevertheless, the rule and rationale remain divisible. That divisibility 
raises questions about whether decisional rationales ought to receive 
 
 61. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1404 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.); see also, e.g., Cap. Traction Co. v. 
Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 12 (1899) (describing the ratio decidendi as “the line of thought pervading and 
controlling the whole opinion”). By contrast, deference generally does not extend to dicta, 
meaning “statements untethered to the facts of the case and not presented for adjudication.” 
GARNER ET AL., supra note 59, at 47. Yet there are exceptions, as courts (including the Supreme 
Court) occasionally treat certain types of dicta as carrying elevated import. See, e.g., Kappos v. 
Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 443 (2012) (concluding that although a particular statement “was not strictly 
necessary” to the holding of the case that contained it, “it was also not the kind of ill-considered 
dicta that we are inclined to ignore”). This phenomenon is common in the context of vertical stare 
decisis, with lower federal courts frequently treating Supreme Court dicta with some degree of 
deference. See KOZEL, supra note 16, at 81–83.  
 62. See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 67–68 (2008) 
(“Judicial reasoning may be integral to the ratio, but the ratio itself is more than the reasoning, 
and within many cases there will be judicial reasoning that [is] not part of the ratio, but obiter 
dicta.”). 
 63. As noted above, Justice Gorsuch invoked the concept of ratio decidendi as defining the 
scope of precedent. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1404 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). He quoted scholarship 
explaining that “[t]he traditional answer to the question of what is a precedent is that subsequent 
cases falling within the ratio decidendi—or rationale—of the precedent case are controlled by that 
case.” Id. at 1404 & n.54 (quoting Frederick Schauer, Precedent, in THE ROUTLEDGE 
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 129 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012)).  
 64. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) (“The Court has upheld a 
narrow class of speech restrictions . . . based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to 
perform their functions.”). 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 152 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).  
 66. See, e.g., Nina Varsava, How To Realize the Value of Stare Decisis: Options for Following 
Precedent, 30 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 62, 93 (2018) (“Judges depend on the justifications behind 
rules when making determinations as to what rule some case stands for, and also whether a 
particular rule covers a new case.”). 
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stare decisis effect in their own right. At least in situations where a rule 
of decision can be articulated independently of its underlying rationale, 
it is debatable whether precedential force should attach solely to the 
former, or to the latter as well. 
As a matter of existing law, rationales, like rules, are entitled to 
stare decisis effect. Put differently, a precedent’s binding scope 
includes its rationale and rule alike. Justice Brett Kavanaugh made this 
point in 2020, noting that “the result and the reasoning each 
independently have precedential force.”67 Justice Gorsuch agreed in 
his opinion in the same case.68 Prior decisions offer similar sentiments, 
observing that “[w]hen an opinion issues for the Court, it is not only 
the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result 
by which we are bound.”69 Justice Kennedy made much the same point 
in an early concurrence, linking stare decisis with judicial rules as well 
as their “explications.”70 
Like decisional rules, underlying rationales play a vital role in 
shaping the law. Treating those rationales as durable promotes the 
ideals of stability and impersonality that underlie the doctrine of stare 
decisis.71  
B. Doctrine and Theory 
The fact that decisional rationales are entitled to stare decisis 
effect complicates the validity of retheorization as a judicial technique. 
To replace one rationale with another is to alter precedent in a 
meaningful way. The reasons offered in support of a judicial decision 
cannot be swapped out like faulty engine parts.  
Yet the question remains whether such alterations are lawful and 
legitimate if the alternative is an outright overruling, which would 
jettison a precedent’s decisional rule along with its rationale. When a 
Justice revises a rationale to change the direction in which a rule is 
 
 67. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part); see also id. (explaining 
that “courts are  . . . bound to follow both the result and the reasoning of a prior decision”). 
 68. Id. at 1404 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.) (“It is usually a judicial decision’s reasoning—its ratio 
decidendi—that allows it to have life and effect in the disposition of future cases.”). 
 69. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996). 
 70. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis 
directs us to adhere not only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their explications of 
the governing rules of law.”). 
 71. See KOZEL, supra note 16, at 36–49 (describing the values the doctrine of stare decisis 
serves). 
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heading, stare decisis demands the presence of a special justification 
for the departure. What if the prospect of retheorization arises for a 
different reason? A Justice might conclude that a decision’s rationale 
is untenable, but that the decision may be preserved on stare decisis 
grounds if it is put on firmer footing. In this situation, the vectors of 
precedent run in opposing directions, because preserving a decisional 
rule depends on updating an underlying rationale. Even if a Justice 
acknowledges that rationales carry precedential effect, she might 
accept revisions designed to uphold a rule that otherwise is in jeopardy. 
Utilized in this way, retheorization may support the goals of stare 
decisis even as it facilitates revision of a decision’s rationale; the 
practice reflects a judicial attempt not to change the law, but rather to 
preserve it insofar as possible. 
These countervailing forces inject complexity into the status of 
retheorization. And the Supreme Court has shown little appetite for 
addressing the issue. The Justices occasionally discuss the dynamics of 
replacing one rationale with another. In 1977, for example, a majority 
opinion penned by Justice William Rehnquist criticized the dissent for 
urging the retention of a precedent but “abandon[ing]” its ratio 
decidendi.72 A few years later, Justice Rehnquist made a similar 
argument in dissent, criticizing a plurality opinion for “rais[ing] the 
banner of ‘stare decisis’” even while setting “out in search of a new 
rationale to support the result reached.”73  
The Court’s most intriguing engagement with retheorization 
occurred in 2010’s Citizens United v. FEC.74 Citizens United was 
notable not only because the Justices reconsidered an important 
precedent, but also because the government made little attempt to 
defend the precedent on its own terms. The applicable decision, Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,75 sustained certain restrictions on 
corporate political advocacy in the face of a First Amendment 
challenge. Under Austin, those restrictions reflected a permissible 
response to the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form.”76 But when the Justices reconsidered Austin in 
 
 72. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 n.7 
(1977). 
 73. Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 291 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 74. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 75. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 76. See id. at 660. 
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Citizens United, the government took a different tack. Rather than 
focusing on the distorting effects of immense wealth—which, by 2010, 
appeared unlikely to move a majority of Justices—the government 
focused its attention on other arguments, such as the contention that 
corporate political advocacy causes actual and perceived corruption.77  
Ultimately, the Court overruled Austin. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy noted that “[w]hen neither party defends the 
reasoning of a precedent, the principle of adhering to that precedent 
through stare decisis is diminished.”78 In other words, at least when it is 
initiated by the parties to litigation, retheorization “diminish[es]” the 
force of stare decisis. Yet the majority offered nothing further on 
retheorization.  
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice John Paul Stevens added 
their own thoughts about the implications of retheorization, both in 
abbreviated fashion. To Chief Justice Roberts, the government’s effort 
to retheorize Austin took stare decisis out of play. Stare decisis, he 
explained, is a doctrine of “preservation, not transformation.”79 When 
a party urges a new rationale upon the Court, its argument carries “no 
. . . precedential sway,” but rather “must stand or fall on [its] own.”80 
The Chief Justice linked this conclusion with “the rule-of-law values” 
underlying the judicial commitment to stare decisis—values that could 
be jeopardized by embracing novel rationales that transform judicial 
precedents.81 
Writing in partial dissent, Justice Stevens saw little difference in 
whether a litigant chooses to defend a precedent’s decisional rule by 
endorsing the articulated reasons or by proposing an alternative 
rationale.82 The choice between reaffirming and overruling a decision 
belongs to the Court, and that choice ought not depend on the vagaries 
of litigation strategies. Justice Stevens also looked to considerations of 
reliance, which play a critical role in the Court’s discussions of stare 
decisis. He posited that “[m]embers of the public . . . often rely on our 
bottom-line holdings far more than our precise legal arguments.”83 To 
the extent the Court’s commitment to precedent is based on protecting 
 
 77. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–49. 
 78. Id. at 363. 
 79. Id. at 384 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 80. Id. at 384–85. 
 81. Id. at 384. 
 82. Id. at 410 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 83. Id. 
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settled expectations, Justice Stevens suggested that the focus should be 
preserving established rules, even if it means revising their conceptual 
underpinnings. 
The Court has not found occasion to elaborate upon these 
statements in the decade since Citizens United. In 2018, a majority 
noted the “dim view” Citizens United took of the government’s attempt 
at retheorization.84 The following year, the Court accepted the 
proposition that shifting justifications provide “another factor 
undermining the force of stare decisis.”85 It seems clear enough that 
some Justices view retheorization as diluting the strength of precedent. 
Yet the Court has not specified the extent of such dilution.  
The Court’s brief statements on retheorization indicate that when 
there is an unusually weak basis for protecting a precedent—or when 
there is an extraordinarily strong basis for overruling it—today’s 
Justices should dispense with any attempt at saving the precedent by 
supplying a novel rationale. But diminishing the force of precedent is 
not the same as removing it altogether. Situations may arise in which a 
precedent’s claim to deference is quite strong because, for example, it 
has engendered substantial reliance. In those situations, deference 
might well be appropriate despite any reduction in stare decisis effect 
brought about by retheorization. More fundamentally, the Court has 
not engaged the question whether (and when) retheorization provides 
a legitimate alternative to overruling. Both as a matter of doctrine and 
as a matter of theory, the status of retheorization remains uncertain. 
It is understandable that there should be skepticism about efforts 
to retheorize precedent. Given that a decision’s rationale exerts 
binding force in future cases, dismissing the articulated rationale can 
weaken the impersonality and continuity norms that the doctrine of 
stare decisis works to promote. There is also some difficulty in 
suggesting that a decision ought to receive deference—which is to say, 
the benefit of the doubt—while being coupled with a rationale that has 
never commanded the confidence of a majority of Justices. There is a 
reasonable argument that once a Justice has decided that she cannot 
accept a decision’s articulated rationale, she should ask herself not 
whether there is some way to salvage the decision, but what is the most 
convincing argument on the merits.  
 
 84. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472 
(2018). 
 85. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019). 
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Further support for this position comes from the fact that a 
decision’s rationale affects its application. It follows that in some cases, 
we should expect the replacement of one rationale with another to alter 
the operation of a decisional rule.86 In light of that reality, the argument 
goes, stare decisis has no place in encouraging a Justice to revise a 
problematic decision’s rationale instead of overruling it outright.  
These concerns are certainly valid, but their force dissipates when 
we return our attention to the conditions under which retheorization 
becomes a live option. The possibility of retheorization arises as an 
alternative to overruling. The question before the Court is whether to 
reject the precedent’s rule and rationale alike or rather to preserve the 
former by revising the latter. Moreover, even if retheorization leads to 
changes in how a rule applies in marginal or exceptional cases, the 
rule’s operation will not be affected in the lion’s share of disputes. If 
the Court had reaffirmed Austin, many types of corporate political 
speech would be subject to regulation irrespective of whether the 
underlying rationale was based on the distorting influence of 
accumulated wealth or corruption of the political process. If the Court 
had reaffirmed Abood, agency fees for public sector unions could be 
constitutionally valid regardless of whether the government’s 
justification in facilitating those fees was preventing free riding or 
ensuring an orderly and efficient workplace. And, as we will see, many 
administrative interpretations of statutes would be entitled to 
deference even if Chevron’s articulated rationale were replaced.  
As these examples suggest, the goal of retheorization is to 
preserve something instead of nothing. The practice reflects a judicial 
effort to promote legal continuity and to look beyond one’s individual 
preferences to the historic practices of the Court as an institution. It 
also protects settled expectations that have built up around a rule’s 
operation and practical effects. Viewed against this backdrop, 
retheorization pushes adjudication in the same direction as the 
doctrine of stare decisis more generally. It is easy enough to recognize 
the vindication of stare decisis when the Court defers to a precedent’s 
rule and its rationale. When circumstances take that possibility off the 
table, retheorization facilitates the maintenance of a stable core—the 
decisional rule—notwithstanding the inevitability of flux around the 
rationale.  
 
 86. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Remedial Chevron, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018) (describing 
ways in which Chevron’s rule might be affected by reconceptualizing the doctrine as a limitation 
on the remedial power of the courts).  
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III.  CAN CHEVRON BE RETHEORIZED? 
In some cases, retheorization will have little effect on the choice 
between retaining and jettisoning a precedent. The newly proposed 
rationale may be so obviously wrong that a majority of Justices would 
not dream of endorsing it. Or it may be so obviously correct that it will 
ensure the Court’s embrace without any need for deference. Situations 
like these render the validity of retheorization largely academic. Yet 
just as stare decisis is most relevant when the scales hang roughly in 
balance, so, too, is retheorization. If a precedent’s articulated reasoning 
is untenable but there is an alternative rationale that the Justices are 
debating, whether that latter justification warrants deference becomes 
a crucial question. 
Which brings us to Chevron. Chevron’s rationale has received its 
share of criticism in recent years, including from some sitting Justices. 
If there is an alternative justification for Chevron that has wider appeal, 
it could affect a crucial pathway of modern administrative law. 
A. Distilling Chevron’s Rationale 
Chevron’s decisional rule and motivating rationale are fairly easy 
to separate, at least as a threshold matter. The case’s rule of decision 
provides that a reviewing court must begin by asking whether the 
statute at issue clearly resolves the pending dispute.87 If the answer is 
yes, the court must follow the statute’s command.88 If the answer is no, 
the court often must defer to the interpretation of an agency charged 
with administering the statute, so long as the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable.89 There is a great deal of nuance, of course, but this is the 
rule in basic terms. 
As for the rationale behind the rule, the Chevron Court noted 
administrative agencies’ subject matter expertise as well as their 
political accountability.90 But the core justification, as reflected in 
Chevron itself and confirmed by subsequent cases, is grounded in 
congressional intent.91 What might appear to be statutory ambiguities, 
the Court explained, are better understood as “legislative 
 
 87. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 88. Id. at 842–43. 
 89. Id.  
 90. See id. at 865; Gluck, supra note 44, at 610 (“[T]he Court announced Chevron with a 
hodgepodge of justifications . . . .”). 
 91. See Gluck, supra note 44, at 610 (“[T]he Court . . . has explicitly re-grounded Chevron in 
congressional intent.”). 
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delegation[s],” albeit of the “implicit” rather than “explicit” variety.92 
Whether Congress “intentionally” left an issue to be addressed by the 
agency or did so “inadvertently,”93 judges must interpret the resulting 
gap as a delegation of authority to the executive branch. In recent years 
the Court has underscored that Chevron’s animating force is the 
primacy of congressional intent, emphasizing the decision’s 
interpretive “presumption that Congress . . . desired the agency (rather 
than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity 
allows.”94  
Chevron thus revolves around an interpretive inference. When 
judges consider a statute and encounter ambiguity surrounding the 
matter in dispute, they must conclude that Congress meant to allocate 
discretion to the agency rather than the courts. The corollary is that 
judges are forbidden from construing statutory ambiguity any other 
way when they confront statutes that fall within the scope of Chevron’s 
rule. Judges cannot conclude that an ambiguity reflects a congressional 
trade-off or oversight calling for judicial resolution. Per Chevron, the 
Supreme Court has already told future courts which inference to draw 
from ambiguity, and it has done so on a categorical basis.95 The reason 
why courts must defer to agencies is, at base, because that is what 
Congress intended. The rule that flows from this reason is the familiar 
two-step, which searches first for statutory clarity and then, where such 
clarity is lacking, prescribes deference to reasonable administrative 
interpretations. 
B. Challenging Chevron’s Rationale 
Having distinguished Chevron’s decisional rule from its 
supporting rationale, we are in position to take a closer look at 
 
 92. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a 
particular question is implicit rather than explicit.”). 
 93. Id. at 865. 
 94. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 488 (2012) (“Chevron 
and later cases find in unambiguous language a clear sign that Congress did not delegate gap-
filling authority to an agency; and they find in ambiguous language at least a presumptive 
indication that Congress did delegate that gap-filling authority.”); United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (describing Congress’s expectation that the relevant agency is 
empowered to exercise “its generally conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory 
ambiguity”); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 
(2001) (“The Supreme Court in recent years has endorsed the notion that Chevron rests on 
implied congressional intent.”). 
 95. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (describing the categorical nature of the Chevron approach). 
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criticisms of Chevron. The goals in doing so are to discern the source 
of dissatisfaction and determine whether any alternative rationales 
might have greater appeal. 
A prominent challenge to Chevron takes direct issue with the 
Court’s intent-based rationale. This challenge casts doubt on the 
premise that congressional ambiguity must be understood as a 
delegation of interpretive authority to administrative agencies.96 There 
is, the argument goes, no basis for drawing such a conclusion. As then-
Judge Gorsuch asked several years ago, “where exactly has Congress 
expressed” the intent to “‘delegate’ its ‘legislative authority’ to the 
executive to make ‘reasonable’ policy choices”?97 He cautioned that 
“[t]rying to infer the intentions of an institution composed of 535 
members is a notoriously doubtful business under the best of 
circumstances,” and drawing such inferences from nothing more than 
silence makes matters worse.98 Moreover, the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) charges courts with “interpret[ing] . . . 
statutory provisions.”99 This enacted language arguably reflects 
Congress’s intention that courts should “overturn agency action 
inconsistent with [judicial] interpretations.”100 
That is where the prospect of retheorization comes in. A Justice 
who is not convinced that Chevron properly captures congressional 
intent still may be reluctant to repudiate the decision’s rule in light of 
other factors, including its prominence, its citation by numerous 
opinions,101 and the reliance it has engendered.102 Dismissing such a 
 
 96. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.; see also Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron 
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 798 (2010) (“The 
conditions under which ambiguity arises support the conclusion that Congress does not intend to 
delegate interpretive power to agencies whenever a statute is ambiguous.”); Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 562 (2009) (noting the “wide range of legal 
scholars” who “have characterized the congressional delegation rationale for Chevron as a 
fiction”). 
 99. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). 
 100. See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); John F. Duffy, 
Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 195 (1998) (discussing the 
“tension between Chevron and Section 706”). 
 101. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 44, at 612 (“[Chevron] is the most cited administrative law 
case in history . . . .”). 
 102. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 996 (2013) (discussing Chevron’s prominence within the legislative branch); 
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pivotal decision might strike some Justices as creating tension with an 
institutional commitment to continuity and impersonality. But if there 
were an alternative explanation for Chevron—one that rested not on 
inferences about congressional intent but instead on other 
considerations—those Justices might be intrigued.103 
The role of retheorization is different for those who deem 
Chevron to be unconstitutional. Some critics contend that, irrespective 
of whether Chevron’s assumption about congressional intent is 
accurate, the legislative branch may not circumvent the judiciary by 
giving agencies the authority to resolve statutory ambiguities.104 The 
claim is that such delegation runs afoul of Article I, which vests 
legislative power in Congress, not the executive.105 The delegation also 
creates potential problems under Article III by “wrest[ing] from 
Courts the ultimate interpretive authority to ‘say what the law is.’”106 
Understood against this backdrop, Chevron undermines the ability of 
“independent courts” to “declar[e] the law’s meaning” and serve as a 
meaningful check on the executive.107 
For those who find these constitutional arguments convincing, 
Chevron’s susceptibility to retheorization is beside the point. A Justice 
who believes that Chevron’s rule is irredeemably unconstitutional and 
that considerations of stare decisis are not powerful enough to carry 
the day need not dwell on the legitimacy and mechanics of 
retheorization.108 But for those who see no inherent constitutional 
problem with the Chevron rule—as well as those who see the 
constitutional question as close enough to be subject to reasonable 
 
Hessick, supra note 86, at 2 (“Since it was decided in 1984, Chevron has been invoked in thousands 
of judicial decisions, and today it regularly underlies policy decisions made by Congress and 
agencies.”).  
 103. There are other potential bases for challenging Chevron beyond those discussed above. 
For one account, see Beermann, supra note 98, at 782–84. 
 104. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1187, 1199 (2016) (“[A]gency interpretation is unconstitutional to the extent it is an 
exercise of subdelegated legislative power.”). 
 106. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712; see also Hamburger, supra note 105, at 1205 (“When a judge 
defers to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, he defers to its judgment about what the law is, 
and he thereby violates his office or duty to exercise his own independent judgment.”). 
 107. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). For an analysis of potential challenges to Chevron on separation-of-powers grounds, 
see Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
26–27 (2017).  
 108. The same goes for other types of constitutional challenges, such as the contention that 
Chevron raises due process concerns. See Hamburger, supra note 105, at 1211–13. 
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debate—it is possible to uphold the rule on an alternative basis even if 
the case’s prevailing, intent-based rationale is untenable.109 This 
distinction suggests the need for precision in examining the grounds for 
challenging debatable precedents, in the context of administrative law 
and as a general matter. Some arguments (such as unassailable 
constitutional arguments) against a given precedent may be 
dispositive, but others leave open the possibility of preservation 
through retheorization. 
C. Replacing Chevron’s Rationale 
Even if one views Chevron’s intent-based rationale as untenable, 
the possibility remains that there are other, more persuasive routes to 
something like the two-step Chevron rule. Exploring those routes 
initiates the process of retheorizing Chevron in pursuit of firmer 
footing.  
There is no shortage of alternative accounts of Chevron. For 
decades, scholars have advanced justifications for the decision that 
minimize or avoid the need to draw inferences about congressional 
intent. The pages that follow offer a brief sampling. The point is not to 
compile every possible argument in support of Chevron’s rule. My aim 
is to illustrate the process of seeking a sounder and more acceptable 
justification for a prominent Supreme Court precedent. 
1. Chevron as Statutory Interpretation.  The simplest defense of 
Chevron’s rule is as a straightforward interpretation of the text of the 
APA.110 A Justice might read the APA to imply that in situations of 
statutory ambiguity, courts should defer to reasonable constructions 
issued by the agency administering the statute.111 Of course, this 
argument is open to challenge as a textual matter. Even so, it is useful 
in illustrating the dynamics of retheorization.  
If a Justice were to view Chevron’s rule as a plausible 
interpretation of the APA, and if she were to conclude further that 
 
 109. On distinctions among potential challenges to Chevron, see Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, 
Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 885 (2020) (discussing the argument 
that “Chevron is wrong not because (or not just because) it departs from the general 
understanding of judicial duty, but because it departs from the particular duty to attend to 
additional, particular positive law on judicial review, namely the APA”). 
 110. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1615 (2019) (“Chevron is not 
incompatible with the original meaning of the governing provision of the Administrative 
Procedure Act . . . .”). 
 111. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). 
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preserving the rule is desirable on grounds of stability, continuity, and 
impersonality, she might be inclined to uphold Chevron as the product 
of straightforward statutory interpretation. Congress could enact a 
statute providing that whenever an agency is charged with 
administering a statute, courts should defer to the relevant agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of ambiguous language. A court that 
interpreted such a statute to mean what it says would not be relying on 
categorical assumptions about congressional behavior. It would be 
accepting and respecting Congress’s instructions. Whether Congress is 
wise to enact statutes that cut across numerous disputes and contexts 
has no bearing on the judicial calculus. This same analysis would apply 
if a Justice construed the APA as expressing Congress’s intention to 
enact something like the Chevron rule. 
2. Chevron as Remedial Principle.  Rather than approaching 
Chevron as the product of statutory interpretation, one could 
reimagine the decision as the application of remedial principles. In a 
recent article, Professor Andrew Hessick reconceptualizes Chevron 
not as requiring judicial deference to interpretations by agencies, but 
rather as limiting courts’ remedial powers. Courts “have the power to 
interpret laws de novo,” but their authority to vacate is limited to 
unreasonable agency actions.112 This theory does not presume to tell 
courts which inferences they must draw from ambiguous statutory 
language. Courts would interpret statutes de novo, unencumbered by 
wide-ranging assumptions about tacit congressional intent. Chevron’s 
impact would be in guiding remedial choices once the interpretive 
process is complete. 
As Professor Hessick notes by way of comparison, in order to 
receive injunctive relief, a plaintiff must go beyond demonstrating a 
violation of rights.113 An injunction demands more, including a 
determination that the balance of hardships supports the award of an 
equitable remedy.114 A retheorized Chevron doctrine would operate in 
much the same way. A Justice who could not accept the Chevron 
Court’s wide-ranging assumptions about implicit congressional intent 
might nevertheless conclude that invalidating an administrative 
 
 112. See Hessick, supra note 86, at 5.  
 113. See id. at 15 (“To obtain an injunction, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant has 
violated . . . the plaintiff’s rights. But that showing is not sufficient by itself.”).  
 114. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“A plaintiff must 
demonstrate . . . that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a 
remedy in equity is warranted.”). 
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interpretation requires something more than disagreement with the 
agency’s reading of the law. Such a Justice would have a sound basis 
for reaffirming Chevron’s decisional rule on grounds of stare decisis, so 
long as retheorization is a valid adjudicative technique. Again, the 
debate ends up revolving around the legitimacy of retheorizing 
precedent. 
3. Chevron as Judicial Management.  Rather than a reflection of 
implicit congressional intent, Chevron may be a tool for sound 
administration of the federal judiciary. There are many federal 
statutes, but only one Supreme Court. Given the Justices’ limited 
capacity, we might expect lower courts effectively to issue the final 
word on numerous statutory disputes. To the extent that lower courts 
reach different conclusions about the best reading of ambiguous 
statutory provisions, their divergence could impair, at least for a while, 
“national uniformity in the administration of national statutes.”115 
Instead of asking each court to reach its own conclusion about the 
meaning of a disputed statute, it may be preferable to encourage 
deference to a single agency charged with administering the statute.116  
For a Justice who rejects Chevron’s intent-based rationale, this 
argument from judicial management is—like the textual and remedial 
arguments discussed above—a position that warrants consideration. 
Different Justices may reach different conclusions about the soundness 
of deferring to administrative determinations in order to promote 
uniformity and efficiency in the interpretation of federal statutes. Still, 
for any Justices who find this judicial management rationale to be 
plausible, there is another potential basis for retheorizing Chevron by 
pairing its established rule with a revised set of reasons.  
*   *   * 
The foregoing examples only scratch the surface of possible 
retheorizations of Chevron.117 The point of introducing them is not to 
 
 115. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 
(1987). 
 116. See id. (explaining that Chevron “can be seen as a device for managing the courts of 
appeals”). 
 117. For other sources describing various justifications for Chevron, see, for example, Merrill 
& Hickman, supra note 94, at 863–72; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare 
Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2227–37 (1997). 
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interrogate them on the merits. Nor is it to crown a successor to 
Chevron’s intent-based rationale, assuming one believes a successor is 
required. The goal is to provide a blueprint for how retheorization 
works and why it matters. 
The validity of retheorization has implications for the trajectory of 
precedent across countless domains. In the case of Chevron, 
retheorization becomes crucial if one or more Justices: (1) reject the 
decision’s existing, intent-based rationale; but (2) see value in 
preserving its rule for reasons of stability, reliance, or impersonality; 
and (3) view an alternative rationale as plausible. If these conditions 
are met, the validity of retheorization and the fate of Chevron go hand 
in hand. 
D. Implications 
If the Supreme Court were to overrule Chevron and hold that 
administrative agencies’ interpretations of statutes are not entitled to 
any deference from judges, even when the statutes are ambiguous and 
the agencies’ interpretations are reasonable, it would create a 
significant disruption in the law. Overruling Chevron could—
depending on the rule that emerged in its place118—have a profound 
effect on federal statutory interpretation and adjudication. An 
overruling could also influence administrative action and legislative 
drafting. Whether or not one sees any benefit arising from these types 
of developments, the continuity of the legal framework would be 
impaired.119  
If, by contrast, the Supreme Court were to renounce Chevron’s 
intent-based rationale while retaining its rule of decision on other 
grounds, the attendant disruption to the legal framework would be far 
less dramatic. A court faced with statutory ambiguity would still defer 
to a reasonable interpretation put forth by an agency tasked with 
administering the statute. Likewise, the legislative and executive 
branches would continue to operate within the extant deference 
regime. Perhaps the retheorization of Chevron would affect the 
 
 118. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (2016) 
(“Abandoning Chevron may not . . . change the frequency and extent of judicial deference as 
much as Chevron’s critics hope or its supporters fear.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(describing the “greatest purpose” of stare decisis as “to serve a constitutional ideal—the rule of 
law”). 
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operation of its rule in a subset of cases,120 but the impact would be far 
weaker than if the Court were to renounce Chevron’s rule altogether. 
Among the principal functions of stare decisis is to prevent judicial 
disagreements from destabilizing the law.121 As the Chevron example 
illustrates, retheorization can aid in that enterprise. Every Justice 
accepts that some precedents are so exceptionally problematic as to 
demand overruling.122 Along similar lines, some precedents ought to be 
repudiated rather than preserved via retheorization. But in other cases, 
retheorization offers a middle ground between reaffirming and 
overruling. When a Justice sees value in retaining an existing rule but 
cannot accept its underlying rationale, retheorization opens a third 
path. It provides a mechanism for minimizing disruption by confirming 
the durability of precedents’ decisional rules even while altering their 
established rationales. 
Stare decisis is, by nature, a second-best solution; better to have 
been right all along.123 Retheorization occupies a similar space in the 
jurisprudential landscape. Deference to precedent finds its fullest 
expression when today’s Justices endorse their predecessors’ rules and 
reasons alike. If that is not possible, some continuity may be preferable 
to none. 
IV.  AFTER RETHEORIZATION 
This Article has focused on situations in which a precedent’s 
actual rationale is irredeemably flawed—and beyond the power of 
stare decisis to save—but an alternative rationale is available. The 
central question is whether a Justice who confronts such a situation 
should defer to precedent by adopting the alternative rationale so long 
as it is plausible. Determining whether deference is appropriate at the 
moment of retheorization is important and complicated, which 
explains the Article’s effort to engage the issue in depth. A separate 
question is what happens after retheorization. The answer to that 
 
 120. See supra Part III.C. 
 121. See KOZEL, supra note 16, at 41 (discussing the relationship between stare decisis and 
judicial impersonality).  
 122. See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1411 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in 
part) (observing in 2020 that “[a]ll Justices now on this Court agree that it is sometimes 
appropriate for the Court to overrule erroneous decisions”). 
 123. Cf. KOZEL, supra note 16, at 100 (discussing the utility of second-best analysis for the 
doctrine of stare decisis, with a focus on “optimizing the performance of an imperfect system”).  
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question, I submit, is a great deal clearer: a retheorized precedent 
carries full stare decisis effect in future cases. 
To understand why, it helps to return to general principles of stare 
decisis. The law of precedent provides that Supreme Court decisions 
receive deference going forward. On occasion, the Court has described 
stare decisis as diminished for precedents that deviate from settled 
law.124 Notwithstanding these statements, precedents generally receive 
deference regardless of whether they arose from an overruling. That 
practice seems both sensible and unavoidable. If all decisions that 
depart from precedent were viewed with suspicion, any overruling 
could lead to perpetual flux. Rather than treating an overruling as an 
isolated, extraordinary event, the Court would trend toward deciding 
each case based on the conclusions of a majority of sitting Justices.  
When the Court overrules a decision, it does not necessarily 
undermine the doctrine of stare decisis. To the contrary, the doctrine 
contemplates departures from precedent under certain circumstances. 
The point of stare decisis is to ensure that overrulings do not occur too 
lightly, too frequently, or for the wrong reasons. A decision that 
overrules precedent for reasons that are consistent with the doctrine of 
stare decisis does nothing untoward, and it stands on the same footing 
as other decisions in the deference it warrants.  
Regardless of whether a precedent departed too hastily from the 
cases that came before it, the relevant question for today’s Court is 
what should happen next. Overruling a decision will tend to be more 
disruptive than retaining it, even if the decision was not as solicitous of 
precedent as it should have been. Judicial flip-flops over a short period 
of time can suggest the primacy of the composition of the Court and 
erode the durability of legal principles. Hence the importance of 
treating precedents with presumptive respect regardless of whether 
they arose from an overruling. 
For decisions that are the product of retheorization rather than 
outright overruling, there is all the more reason to defer. The genesis 
of retheorization is the recognition that a precedent is unlikely to 
survive in its present form. Rather than jettisoning a precedent’s rule 
of decision as well as its rationale, a Justice can use retheorization to 
salvage that which is salvageable. By preserving the decisional rule on 
 
 124. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363 (overruling a decision that “itself contravened 
this Court’s earlier precedents”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996) (offering 
among the justifications for overruling that the precedent under review “deviated sharply” from 
established law). 
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new grounds, the Justice protects settled expectations and promotes 
legal continuity to the extent possible under the circumstances. As a 
result, it is fitting that retheorized precedents be vested with full stare 
decisis effect going forward. That is true as a categorical matter, and it 
is true of Chevron. A retheorized Chevron would continue to warrant 
deference for its rule of decision. It would also warrant deference for 
its newly adopted rationale—provided that the rationale falls within 
the protection afforded by stare decisis, which is the topic of the next 
Part.  
V.  IS CHEVRON ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE IN THE FIRST PLACE? 
Chevron is notable not only for its prominence, but also for the 
nature of the rule it sets forth. The case’s rule of decision sweeps far 
beyond the resolution of a particular dispute about the meaning of the 
Clean Air Act. It is widely understood to have established a broad 
analytical approach that applies to numerous statutes, as interpreted 
by numerous administrative agencies, implicating numerous fact 
patterns. At the same time, Chevron is not a full-fledged methodology 
of interpretation such as textualism or purposivism. It does not claim 
to set forth a framework for the resolution of every dispute over a 
federal statute’s meaning. 
The nature of Chevron’s rule creates uncertainty about the role of 
stare decisis, as I have explained in other work.125 The Supreme Court 
has consistently treated Chevron’s rule of decision as binding 
precedent.126 The implication is that the Chevron Court, acting at a 
particular moment in time and operating within a discrete statutory 
context, possessed wide-ranging authority to shape the trajectory of the 
law in future cases involving the interpretation of statutes other than 
the Clean Air Act. On that understanding, the Chevron Court wielded 
enormous influence, extending far beyond the case presented for 
 
 125. See Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of 
Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1152–53 (2019) (asking whether stare decisis ought to apply 
to rules like the Chevron framework). 
 126. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2129 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (observing 
that Chevron “remains good law”); Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation 
on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
1298, 1346 (2018) (explaining that the authors’ judicial respondents viewed Chevron as carrying 
“indisputable precedential weight”); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory 
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 
1817 (2010) (describing the Supreme Court’s treatment of Chevron as evidence of its acceptance 
of “methodological stare decisis” in a discrete context). 
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review. At the same time, Chevron reduced the interpretive discretion 
of future Justices across a range of disputes and scenarios. It 
accordingly raised concerns about giving judges too much power to 
make binding pronouncements on matters not before them.  
These concerns are all the more resonant because of what 
Chevron purports to do. As originally rationalized, Chevron tells 
judges which conclusions they must draw from the fact of congressional 
ambiguity. If ambiguity exists, there is no room for independent 
analysis where Chevron applies. The only permissible inference is a 
delegation of authority to the relevant administrative agency. Chevron 
reduces, on a macro level, judges’ authority to reach their own 
conclusions about the meaning of legal texts. 
This combination of exceptional breadth and intrusion upon 
interpretive choice arguably places Chevron beyond the domain of 
stare decisis. As Justice Gorsuch recently suggested in discussing the 
related issue of agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations, it 
may be going too far to extend stare decisis to “generally applicable 
interpretive methods.”127 Deference to precedent is appropriate for 
decisions that “settle the meaning of a single statute or regulation or 
resolve a particular case.”128 Deference also applies to many rules 
embodied in judicial decisions. But not all rules are similarly situated 
when it comes to stare decisis, and those that compel interpretive 
choices demand a sacrifice from today’s judges—while handing a 
commensurate power to yesterday’s judges—that may be too much to 
bear.  
If this argument has merit, the Chevron framework carries no 
claim to deference under the law of stare decisis. This conclusion does 
not owe solely to Chevron’s rule of decision. It is the product of 
Chevron’s broad rule combined with its rationale, the latter of which 
makes a core interpretive choice on behalf of future judges and 
Justices. Had the Chevron Court set forth the same decisional rule on 
a different rationale—such as one of the rationales described above in 
Part III.C—it might have avoided this problematic intrusion upon 
interpretive discretion. In that scenario, Chevron could fall within the 
customary bounds of stare decisis. 
 
 127. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2444 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment); 
see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 114 n.1 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (citing CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 701 (2011)). 
 128. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2444 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Despite this conceptual complexity, and notwithstanding 
objections raised by some Justices, the Court continues to characterize 
Chevron as settled law, presumably warranting respect as a binding 
precedent. The status quo is a situation in which Chevron is treated as 
falling within the bounds of the doctrine of stare decisis. For any 
Justices who accept the view that Chevron is presumptively binding but 
who harbor serious doubts about its intent-based rationale, the 
prospect of retheorization remains salient. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has made four claims. First and foremost, it is 
worthwhile to examine the phenomenon of retheorization, whereby a 
court replaces a precedent’s faulty rationale as a way of preserving its 
decisional rule. Second, the law and theory of retheorization remain 
unsettled at the Supreme Court, leaving a need for further analysis. 
Third, the Justices should—consistent with the aims of stare decisis—
view retheorization as a legitimate and useful mechanism for 
promoting the stability of legal rules.  
Finally, Chevron is a good candidate for preservation via 
retheorization, assuming that a majority of Justices reject its intent-
based rationale. Chevron’s two-step rule is a major component of 
modern administrative law. What is more, scholars have offered a 
variety of possibilities for defending much of Chevron’s rule without 
needing to rely on the reasons the Court set forth in 1984. Overruling 
Chevron would be “a jolt to the legal system”129—whatever the merits 
of that decision’s original rationale, and whatever regime arose in its 
place. The most complete safeguard against such a jolt is reaffirmance. 
When that option is off the table, retheorization is a valuable second-
best approach. Stare decisis suggests that those binding elements of a 
judicial decision which can be saved should be saved, barring some 
exceptional justification for departure. Retheorization represents a 




 129. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 9, at 144 (statement of Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr.).  
